Contradictions in an Early Baptist Tract against Compulsion of Conscience

Over the past few months I have been preparing a dissertation entitled “To Every Man’s Conscience: Early English Baptists and the Fight for Religious Liberty (1612-1689).” To give a balanced and accurate portrayal of the historical-theological development of this important and ever-relevant Baptist distinctive, I have been taking in as much as possible of the primary sources available at the treasure-horde that is the British Library. Yesterday, I finished reading through part one of a work by the Particular Baptist Christopher Blackwood with the snappy title: The storming of Antichrist, in his two last and strongest garrisons; of compulsion of conscience, and infants babptisme [sic]. Wherein is set down a way and manner for cburch [sic] constitution; together with markes to know right constituted churches, from all other societies in the world. Also the cruelty inequality and injustice of compulsion for conscience, by 29. arguments is opened; with an answer to 26. objections brought for the same. Also 12. arguments against the baptizing of infants; with an answer to 26. objections brought for the same. Wherein is displayed to the view of all, from the testimonies of Scriptures, Fathers, councels; the mischiefs, uncertainties, novelties, and absudities [sic] that do attend the same. Wherein is answered the most valid arguments brought by St. Martiall, in his sermon preached in the Abbey Church at Westminister, for the defence hereof. With an answer to Mr. Blake his arguments, in his book cald Birth-priviledge; and to the arguments of divers others. As also a catechisme, wherein is cleerely opened the doctrine of baptisme, together with a resolution of divers questions and cases of conscience, about baptisme. Otherwise known as The storming of Antichrist.

I am aware that there were different types of religious liberty called for in the seventeenth century, and even among Baptists (who generally speaking advocated universal religious liberty), some variations existed. I was not prepared however for the levels of self-contradiction I perceived among Blackwood’s often quite excellent arguments. In the main body of Part I, he expounds 29 points against compulsion of conscience in matters of religion. Many of these appear explicitly to advocate the same universal liberty advocated by other early Baptists. For example:

“To force Papists and prophane multitudes, whether they will or no, to joyne in one worship, one word, Baptisme, Supper and Identity of communion, is not according to the word; but though it carrie the specious show of a glorious uniformity, yet doth it beget nothing but a politick hypocriticall faith, which changes according to the vicissitude of Armies in time of warre, and the multitude of Princes, States, and humane Lawes, in time of Peace.”

He argues that we are to reduce people to the truth only through the Sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, and not through carnal weapons and persecution. Another two of his points relates to being a winsome testimony to Jews, Muslims, and the heathen peoples of the world.

“This compulsion of conscience, will be a speciall bar to hinder the Jewes conversion, for whenever they are converted to the faith of Christ, its likely they must be brought home thereto voluntarily, out of the strength they see in the truth, not by compulsion of fines, banishment, imprisonment, &c.”

It will much harden Heathens and Mahometans, not to permit christians among them, or at least not to have any great freedome in their countries, because where Christians get the upper hand, the compell all persons to embrace their religion, yea this very principle doubtlesse scares the Papists from letting the Protestants have such freedome in their countries, because if they should prove the stronger party, they would compell them to a religion they so much abhor. Hence in sundry popish countries, they tolerate all or most religions, save Protestanisme.”

He later applies his principles with particular reference to Jews, as well as to “Papists” (whom he also calls “Idolaters”). All of this is fine and good. However, in a segment where he is discussing various objections to his argument, he makes statements which appear to go completely against everything he has argued beforehand...

One objection is: "Magistrates are to be a terror to evil workers, Rom. 13. But heresie is an evil work." Blackwood answers by noting three types of evil: works against the light of nature and reason, against the light of the nations, and against the light of faith. The first two categories contain evils he considers punishable by the civil authorities, whereas the last category does not.

Works against the light of nature and reason are described as

"the setting up of Mahomet or any other God besides him that is the creator of heaven and earth; Atheisme, when any man shall boldly affirme there is no God, Polytheisme, when men affirm many gods, Blasphemy, Murder, Adultery, Falsewitnesse, Perjury, Theft, Disobedience to parents, Sedition, Sodomy, Buggery, Drunkennesse, tumults against the publike peace, &c. These and such like, the Magistrate, whether heathen or Christian, is to be a terror unto."

So Muslims and other unbelievers are supposed to be persecuted after all? And what exactly is a heathen Magistrate as mentioned in the last sentence supposed to do? Persecute people he actually agrees with and be a terror to himself?

Works against the light of the nations are laid out in the context of a nation with a Christian majority. In such a situation the Magistrate, according to Blackwood, may punish any who rail against Christ, deny the Scriptures to be his word, and claim that the epistles were only profitable for the particular churches to whom they were originally written. What is his rationale? To quote him directly: “Because all or most Nations in the world do it.” That sort of argumentation is not good enough for him elsewhere, so why is it at this point?

As if it couldn't get anymore confusing, he explores the area of evils committed against the light of faith: denial of Christ, participating in false worship, unbelief, impenitence, heresy, and schism.” Of these, it appears that Blackwood does another about face, and says “the Magistrate cannot be a terror unto.” In the pages that follow he warns that violence will exasperate people but not win them, separates civil and spiritual into different spheres of authority, and is quite clear that

 “We have no command to root out any for conscience, and lesse then a command will not serve, nor have wee any example in the New Testament for the same.”

This brings me to a series of questions for which I do not have a clear answer. If you are acquainted with Baptist history and theology or can help in any way to clarify my thinking, I would greatly appreciate it. Feel free to pass this on to other such people who might also be able to assist. 

1. Is Blackwood just being woefully inconsistent?

2. Am I missing something? Is there an interpretive key in Blackwood’s book, or perhaps even some distinctive within his circles, that might indicate these are something other than bizarre fluctuations in a seemingly two-faced argument?

3. Panning out to take in the broader scope of the book, is Blackwood saying that these punishable evils of a religious nature might be offences legitimately punishable by authorities, although that is not the best option? In other words, they can punish such things according to man’s ways, but really shouldn’t according to God’s ways (as he writes “God’s ways are always the safest, and that which most concerns his own glory.”)?

4. Are the punishable religious offences more serious than peaceful observances of personal belief? Are they disturbing the public peace in a significant and violent way? Do they in some way create a real national security hazard (not unlike Islamic fundamentalists of today)? When arguing specifically for religious liberty extending to Papists, Blackwood says that if they grow in number the Magistrate “may command some of them out of the Kingdome, because the safety of the people is the highest law…”

5. Is Blackwood really arguing only for freedom of belief, but not of practice?

Again, I would appreciate any input.